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1. INTRODUCTION
Maintaining Internet network resources available and se-
cured is an unmet challenge. Hence, traffic classification
and anomaly detection received much attention in the last
few years, and several algorithms have been proposed for
backbone traffic. However, the evaluation of these methods
usually lacks rigor, leading to hasty conclusions. Since syn-
thetic data is rather criticized and common labeled database
(like the data sets from the DARPA Intrusion Detection
Evaluation Program [6]) is not available for backbone traf-
fic; researchers analyze real data and validate their methods
by manually inspecting their results, or by comparing their
results with other methods. Our final goal is to label the
MAWI database [2] which is an archive of real backbone
traffic traces publicly available. Since manual labeling of
backbone traffic is unpractical, we build this database by
cross-validating results from several methods with different
theoretical backgrounds. This systematic approach permits
to maintain updated database in which recent traffic traces
are regularly added, and labels are improved with upcoming
algorithms. In this paper we discuss the difficulties faced
in comparing events provided by distinct algorithms, and
propose a methodology to achieve it.
This work will also help researchers in understanding re-
sults from their algorithms. For instance, while developing
anomaly detector, researchers commonly face a problem in
tuning their parameter set. The correlation between ana-
lyzed traffic and parameter set is complicated. Therefore,
researchers usually run their application with numerous pa-
rameter settings, and the best parameter set is selected by
looking at the highest detection rate. Although this process
is commonly accepted by the community a crucial issue still
remains. Let say a parameter set A gives a similar detec-
tion rate than a parameter set B, but a deeper analysis of
reported events shows that B is more effective for a certain
kind of anomalies not detectable with the parameter set A
(and vice versa). This case is important and should not
be ignored, however, it cannot be observed with a simple
comparison of detection rate.
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Figure 1: Two events reporting the same port scan.
Alarm 1 could identify only the beginning of this
activity, event 2 identify the end of it.
2. DIFFICULTIES
Comparing events reported by several anomaly detectors
or traffic classifiers seems at first glance to be trivial, but
in practice, it is a baﬄing problem. The main issue is that
events from different algorithms are expressed in distinct
ways that are difficult to systematically compare.
The heterogeneity of events results from the diverse traf-
fic abstractions, dimensionality reductions and theoretical
tools employed by anomaly detectors and traffic classifiers.
For example; (1) hash based (sketch) anomaly detectors [3,
5] usually report only IP addresses and corresponding time
bin, no other information (e.g. port number) describe iden-
tified anomalies. (2) In previous work [4] we developed an
anomaly detector based on image processing that reports
events as a set of IP addresses, port numbers and timestamps
corresponding to a group of packets identified in analyzed
pictures. (3) Several intrusion detection systems take ad-
vantage of clustering techniques to identify anomalous traffic
[7]. These methods classify flows in several groups and re-
port clusters with abnormal properties. Thereby, the events
reported by these methods are sets of flows.
The easiest way to compare those different kinds of event
is to digest all of them in the same form. A usual way is to
reduce all events to the less restrictive form; meaning in our
case that we examine only the source or destination IP ad-
dresses. This level of abstraction allows to handle the case
illustrated in Fig. 1. However, comparing only IP addresses
introduce approximations and errors. Obviously, an event
reporting http traffic from a certain host and another event
reporting ssh traffic from the same host should be differen-
tiated.
If we examine also the port information to compare events,
then we then have difficulties in handling the example given
in Fig. 1; and so forth, inspecting more event information
makes the task harder.
3. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
We are now investigating a solution able to handle any
kind of events and analyzing all their details. The main idea
underlying this approach is to create a graph with events as
nodes and find community structure in it. Thus, a commu-
nity is a set of events, and it represents traffic identified by
these events. The main difficulty in constructing such graph
is to link the events (nodes) with respect to their similarities.
How can we evaluate the similarity between events?
In order to precisely measure events similarities, we need
to retrieve the original traffic. For example, let X be an
event corresponding to traffic emitted from a single host,
and Y an event representing traffic received by another host.
X and Y can represent exactly the same traffic but from two
different points of view, one reports the source whereas the
other reports the destination of the traffic. The only way
to verify if these events are related is to also investigate the
analyzed traffic. If all traffic reported by X is also reported
by Y , then we can conclude that they are strongly related.
Also, we need a similarity measure to score their similitudes.
In constructed graphs, nodes are linked with weighted
edges informing on the level of similitude between them.
The weight of an edge linking events X and Y is computed
with the following equation:
w = f(X, Y )/min(f(X), f(Y ))
where f is a function computing the number of packets cor-
responding to all events given as parameters. w is included
in (0, 1], 1 means that events are strongly related whereas
values close to 0 represent weak relationships.
One can find similar events by looking at connected com-
ponent. However, when graphs are generated from events
reported by numerous algorithms using several parameter
sets, then loose events connect distinct components with
edges having a low weight. Algorithms finding community
structure [1] helps us in separating those distinct compo-
nents. For example Figure 2 is a graph of alarms reported by
a method based gamma modeling [3] (blue circles) and one
based on image processing [4] (red and green circles repre-
senting results obtained with distinct parameters). Dashed
lines in Figure 2 is the community structure found by the
algorithm proposed in [1]. In such partitioning of the graph,
a community consists of several alarms reporting the same
anomalous traffic, and all communities stand for distinct
anomalies.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented the difficulties in examining events
reported by anomaly detectors or traffic classifiers. A method-
ology to compare events expressed in different ways has been
proposed. Our approach relies on the abstraction level of
graph theory to group different kinds of events standing for
same traffic. Graphs are generated from events reported by
several methods classifying traffic and original traffic. The
structure of these graphs uncover the similarities of events.
Thus, a community mining algorithm permits to distinguish
sets of events standing for different traffic. Preliminary re-
sults are promising, but still, the evaluation of the proposed
method has to be conducted.
The proposed methodology will help us in building a com-
mon database providing valuable assistance for researchers
inspecting backbone traffic. For instance, such database can
Figure 2: Example of distinct components linked
together. Dashed lines represent the separation in
community structure [1]. The green and red cir-
cles are alarms reported by a method based on im-
age processing [4], their labels are rough as they
stand only for the prominent IP addresses of traf-
fic reported. However, labels within blue circles are
the exact IP addresses reported by another method
based on gamma modeling [3].
be used as a ground truth to validate upcoming classification
algorithms.
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